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Governing Cascade Failures in
Complex Social-EcologicalTechnological Systems: Framing
Context, Strategies, and Challenges
J.B. Ruhl*
ABSTRACT

Cascade failures are events in networked systems with
interconnectedcomponents in which failure of one or a few parts triggers
the failure of other parts, which triggers the failure of more parts, and
so on. Cascadefailures occur in a wide variety of familiar systems, such
as electric power distribution grids, transportationsystems, financial
systems, and ecosystems. Cascade failures have plagued society for
centuries. However, modern social-ecological-technological systems
(SETS) have become vast, fast moving, and highly interconnected,
exposing these systems to cascade failures of potentially global
proportions, spreading at breathtaking speed, and imposing
catastrophicharms. The increasingpotentialfor cascade failures of the
magnitude of the 2008 financial system collapse, which had a truly
global reach and affected systems well beyond finance, screams out for
clear thinking about governing vulnerability to cascade failures in
SETS. Yet, legal scholarshipon the theme is essentially nil, and a more
comprehensive, generalizablegovernance theory leveraging knowledge
from scientific research on cascade failures has not emerged. Research
initiatives are needed to forge ground on three fronts: (1) system
modeling and monitoring; (2) event prediction;and (3) event prevention,
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response, and recovery. This Article is a first step in that direction. Part
I outlines the cascade failuresproblem. PartII summarizes the scientific
researchon cascade failures. PartIII identifies strategiesfor controlling
cascadefailures. PartIV explores the governance challenges of deploying
those various strategies in large-scale SETS. Part Vextends the analysis
to the special case of cascade failures within ecological systems and the
difficulties of managing them through the strategies coming out of
cascade failures science. Lastly, Part VI suggests directions of future
researchon governance of cascade failures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 2019, unknown criminals from an unknown location
took control of most of the city of Baltimore's municipal online computer
servers, freezing all access to them, and demanded a ransom payment
of $80,000 in Bitcoin within ten days or else all of the city's data would
be destroyed.' Having pursued an agenda of moving many municipal

1.

The events recounted in this paragraph are documented with references to sources at

A Timeline of the Baltimore City Ransom ware Attack, CYWARE, https://cyware.com/blog/a-timeline-
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services and payment systems from paper to online, the effects of the
attack rippled through Baltimore's public and private sectors. City
employees, who had no access to their work computers and email
accounts, opened Gmail accounts on their personal computers, but
Google flagged the bulk creation of accounts from the same network as
suspicious and automatically froze them (though they were restored
soon after). Property sales could not go forward without information
from the city's online system, and property tax, water bills, parking
tickets, and many other forms of payments to the city could not be
completed. The city migrated many functions back to paper, but the
wheels of city services then moved slowly. By the end of the month,
Baltimore officials estimated the cost of restoring all systems to be over
$18 million. Apparently frustrated by the city's refusal to pay the
ransom, in early June, the attackers began releasing sensitive
documents and threatened to leak citizens' personal information on the
dark web. One month after the attack, just over a third of city
employees had access to their computers and email accounts. By
mid-June, most employees were back online, but many payment
systems were still offline and far behind-for example, the city warned
that water meters would continue to read water use while the payment
system is offline, so residents should expect unusually high water bills
once that system recovered.
In short, Baltimore experienced a cascade failure. 2 Cascade
failures are events in networked systems with interconnected
components in which failure of one or a few parts triggers the failure of
other parts, which triggers the failure of more parts, and so on. 3
Cascade failures are found in a wide variety of familiar systems, such
as electric power distribution grids, transportation systems, financial
systems, and ecosystems. 4 The financial crisis of 2008 has been

of-the-baltimore-city-ransomware-attack-d006 [https://perma.cc/X43Y-D432] (last updated June
5, 2019).
2.
Baltimore is by no means alone in experiencing this form of ransomware. See Manny
Fernandez, David E. Sanger & Marina Trahan Martinez, Ransomware Attacks Are Testing Resolve
of Cities Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/ransomware-attacks-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/CCC2-PKTV]; Frances Robles, A City Paid a
Hefty Ransom to Hackers. But Its Pains Are Far from Over, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/florida-ransom-hack.html [https://perma.cc/A9ZQ-U79R].
3.
Raissa M. D'Souza, CurtailingCascadingFailures, 358 SCIENCE 860, 860 (2017); Yang
Yang et al., Small Vulnerable Sets Determine Large Network Cascades in Power Grids, 358
SCIENCE 886, 886 (2017).
4.
Qian Zhu et al., Optimization of CascadingFailure on Complex Network Based on
NNIA, 501 PHYSICAA 42, 42 (2018); D'Souza, supra note 3; John W. Terborgh, Toward a Trophic
Theory of Species Diversity, 112 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 11415 (2015).
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described as a cascade failure,5 and the loss of "keystone" species in an
ecosystem can lead to cascading effects throughout the ecosystem.6 In
these and many other cases, the failure of one system component is all
it takes to trigger the cascade failure, as in the case of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy.7 The cause of the initial failure event can seem
random and trivial in isolation,8 and the same event in the same system
will not always trigger a cascade failure.9 Once the cascade starts,
however, it can be virtually unstoppable. 10 Failure in one system can
also jump to other interconnected systems as well-for example, a
power station failure could knock out a regional distribution grid, which
then shuts down water supply systems, which then disrupts
wastewater treatment plants, and so on.11
Although it can be easy to imagine how cascade failures like this
could happen, researchers have not made much progress on predicting
when, where, how, and why they happen, and even less progress has
been made on what to do about a cascade failure when it does happen.
Some systems, particularly those with complex interconnections, are
believed to build up greater "systemic risk" exposure to cascade
failures, 12 but beyond that core principle, researchers are still
continuing to explore questions about the conditions of systemic risk,
how failure moves through the system, how systems repair after failure,
and other basic properties of cascade failure. 13
Cascade failures have plagued society for centuries. However,
modern social and technological systems have become vast, fast moving,
and highly interconnected, exposing these systems to cascade failures
of potentially global proportions, spreading at breathtaking speed, and
imposing catastrophic harms. The chief driver behind this quantum
shift in failure speed and magnitude has been advancements in
technology, specifically (1) the expanding reach and connections to the
internet; 14 (2) the ever-larger and more interconnected infrastructure

5.

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMN, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 432 (2011)

(assessing causes of the financial crisis, including failures in regulation).
6.
Terborgh, supra note 4.
7.

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at xvi, 324.

8.
9.
10.

D'Souza, supra note 3, at 861.
Id.
Id.

11.
COMM'N To ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
ATTACK, CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES 34, 142 (Apr. 2008).

12.
13.
14.

Yang et al., supra note 3.
Id.
Zhu et al., supra note 4.
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systems; 15 and (3) vast increases in computational capacity and speed,
allowing rapid automation of system operations and decisions. 16 Today,
there exists a globally connected society in which information travels
around the world in a matter of seconds and people, energy, goods, and
materials can move around in increasingly larger quantities, at faster
speeds, and over greater distances. Technology more generally has also
been the driver of increasingly frequent and larger ecological cascade
failures, such as climate change1 7 and loss of biodiversity.18 Indeed,
although we
often compartmentalize
social,
ecological,
and
technological systems as distinct, it is becoming difficult to disaggregate
them in operation, as automated online systems increasingly run
infrastructure systems, expanding infrastructure systems increasingly
degrade ecological systems, and degraded ecological systems diminish
the resilience of human social and economic systems.19
Researchers have begun referring to and studying these vast
"systems -of-systems" as complex social-ecological-technological systems
(SETS). 20 As one researcher explains:
Adopting a SETS lens can help identify vulnerabilities that develop within
infrastructure systems over time. Ultimately, adopting this SETS perspective will

15.

COMM'N To ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)

ATTACK, supra note 11, at 1, 18, 92, 134, 143.
16.
Patrick McCarthy, Infographic: The Growth of Computer Processing Power, RECOIL
OFFGRID (May 2, 2017), https://www.offgridweb.com/preparation/infographic-the-growth-of-computer-processing-power/ [https://perma.cc/S7Z5-7KDU]; see also Jin Yoshikawa, Sharing the Costs
of Artificial Intelligence: Universal No-Fault Social Insurance for Personal Injuries, 21 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. 1155, 1159-60 (2019).
17.

IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING AT 1.50C 6, 26 (2018).

18.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & EcosYs. SERVS.,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY
AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 3 (2019).

19.
Samuel A. Markolf et al., InterdependentInfrastructureas Linked Social, Ecological,
and Technological Systems (SETSs) to Address Lock-in and Enhance Resilience, 6 EARTH'S FUTURE
1638, 1638 (2018); COMMN To ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

(EMP) ATTACK, supra note 11, at 34.
20.

Samuel A. Markolf et al., supra note 19; Nancy B. Grimm et al., Does the Ecological

&

Concept ofDisturbanceHave Utility in Urban Social-Ecological-TechnologicalSystems?, 3 ECOSYS.
HEALTH & SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1 (2017); John C. Little et al., A Tiered, System -of-Systems Modelling
Framework for Resolving Complex Socio-EnvironmentalPolicy Issues, 112 ENVTL. MODELLING
SOFTWARE 82, 82 (2019). The SETS model has emerged from the broad research agenda focused
on management of social-ecological systems. See Maja Schliter et al., Capturing Emergent
Phenomena in Social-Ecological Systems: An Analytical Framework, 24 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y
art. 11(2019), https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol24/iss3/art 11/ [https://perma.cc/KRX4-ERPV].
Under some conditions-e.g., management of a lake in a rural area-technological systems might
not play an important direct role in system dynamics. This is decreasingly the case, however, as
climate change-the product primarily of technological systems-is affecting ecological and social
systems globally.

412

AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:2:407

not only help us better understand our infrastructure systems, but also aid in the
development strategies for adapting to the many challenges that our infrastructure
will continue to face (climate change, interdependencies, technological evolution,
2
growing complexity, etc.). 1

As social, ecological, and technological systems increasingly
become interconnected at larger scales into SETS, they become
inseparable, and tinkering in one subsystem can affect multiple other
interconnected subsystems.

22

Consider communication of information

between people. Long ago, of course, it was all by word of mouth. That
was a purely social system. But successive technological
advancements-writing, the printing press, the telegraph, the
telephone, and so on until today's internet-have leveraged
technological networks to vastly increase the speed and scale of human
communications embedded in technological infrastructure. Are
Facebook and Twitter social systems or technological systems? They are
both-one does not exist without the other.
To be sure, plenty of social benefits are made possible by the
scale and power of this new breed of massive systems-of-systems-no
one is proposing to do away with the internet-but part of what is made
possible is also system-wide failure. As one study on infrastructure
explained:
The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of
systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent
infrastructures ("critical national infrastructures") whose harmonious functioning
enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the
orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these
infrastructures to threats-deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature-is the focus of
greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of
23
9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita.

The increasing potential for cascade failures of the magnitude of
the 2008 financial system collapse, which had a truly global reach and
affected systems well beyond finance, 2 4 screams out for clear thinking
about governing vulnerability to cascade failures in SETS. Much like
the governance of natural disasters, such as wildfires and hurricanes, 25
and of emergencies more generally, 26 cascade failure governance would
involve improvements in system monitoring, event prediction, and

21.
22.

Markolf et al., supra note 19.
Id.

23.

COMM'N To ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

ATTACK, supra note 11, at vi.
24.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
25.

COMM'N, supra note

(EMP)

5.

See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (3rd ed. 2015).

26.
See Amy L. Stein, Delegating Emergency Powers 28 (Aug. 16, 2019) (unpublished
draft) (on file with author).
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harm prevention, response, and recovery. Although governance
scholarship has touched on some of these qualities in various settings,
particularly through studies of systemic risk in financial systems, 2 7
electric power grids, 28 and ecological systems, 2 9 legal scholarship on the
theme is essentially nil, 30 and a more comprehensive, generalizable
governance theory leveraging knowledge from scientific research on
cascade failures has not emerged. This Article is a first step in that
direction.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a background
on the current science of cascade failures, which focuses primarily on
technological systems such as power grids and the financial systems,
describing what is known about them and what remains to be explored
and answered (the latter being by far the larger category). Part III
contextualizes that background in the domain of SETS governance,
outlining possible public and private measures that could extend
strategies being developed in the technological applications into social
and ecological settings, such as finance, social media, and climate
change. Part IV explores the governance challenges of deploying those
various strategies in large-scale SETS, particularly given that some
strategies, such as walling off vulnerable system components or cutting
off connections to block a cascade, can impose serious harm to some
parts of a system in order to prevent more widespread harm throughout
the system. Part V extends the analysis to the special case of cascade
failures within ecological systems and the difficulties of managing them
through the strategies coming out of cascade failures science. Part VI
concludes with some thoughts about the directions of future research
on governance of cascade failures, particularly those looming large on
the horizon as technology advances.
The Baltimore ransomware debacle, and its severe consequences
to the city and its citizens, both could have been prevented and could
have been much worse. Information technology experts have criticized

27.
Stefano Battiston et al., Complexity Theory and FinancialRegulation, 351 SCIENCE
818, 818 (Feb. 19, 2016); Caitlin Chambers et al., The System Made Me Do It? Regulating
Systematic Risk, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES, GOVERNANCE, AND COMPLEXITY: APPLICATIONS AND

FRONTIERS 212-239 (Victor Galaz ed., 2019).
28.
Massoud Amin, Challenges in Reliability, Security, Efficiency, and Resilience of
Energy Infrastructure:Toward Smart Self-Healing Electric Power Grid, IEEE (2008), https://ieexplore.icee.org/abstract/document/4596791 [https://perma.cc/7T89-EK86].
29.
Marten Scheffer et al., CatastrophicShifts in Ecosystems, 413 NATURE 591, 591 (2001).
30.
A Westlaw search conducted on June 22, 2019, in the Law Reviews and Journals
library for "cascade failure" resulted in seven articles, none of which discuss the theme
comprehensively.
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the city for failing to keep up with cyberattack prevention measures. 31
That was a governance failure. Luckily, however, Baltimore was for all
practical purposes an island-the attack did not spread to other
jurisdictions' systems because its system was not connected to them.
Connections between systems can add to overall efficiency and
robustness of the "system-of-systems" but also open the door to broader
harm when one system suffers a failure that spreads to other systems.
As global society increasingly reaps the benefits of larger, faster, more
connected systems embedded in SETS, cascade failure in SETS looms
larger as a governance challenge.
II. THE SCIENCE OF CASCADE FAILURES

Wherever you are the moment you are reading this sentence,
pause for a moment and look around you. Chances are you are
benefitting from many different systems-the electric power grid is
delivering energy for lights, computers, and ventilation systems; the
internet is allowing you access to email, entertainment, and
information; and telecommunications systems allow you to call a friend.
Later today, you may use a credit card (financial system) to buy a meal
at a grocery store (food system) on your way home via light-rail
(transportation system). Very few people know in detail how any one of
these systems works, and almost nobody knows how all of them work.
Now imagine that they all fail-the lights go off, computers shut down,
and ventilation stops; your phone doesn't work; the store has no food,
but your credit card doesn't work anyway; the trains stop running.
Obviously, something went wrong. But what, and why?
This scenario is not outlandish. For example, a massive
electromagnetic pulse, whether from a high-altitude nuclear detonation
or a massive solar-flare storm, has the potential to disrupt the nation's
entire electric power distribution grid, in which case every
inconvenience described in the scenario, and more, will happen as the
lack of power spreads through and disables other interconnected
infrastructure components (illustrated in Figure 1).32 Indeed, a brief
31.
Dave Weinstein, Hackers Hold Baltimore Hostage, WALL ST. J. (May 30,
2019, 6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-hold-baltimore-hostage- 11559256722
[https://perma.cc/D9UU-MUKU].
32.
ATTACK,

COMM'N TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
supra note 11, at 160; COMM'N To ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK, EXECUTIVE REPORT 1 (July 2017), http://www.firstemp-

commission.org/uploads/1/1/9/5/119571849/executivereport-on-assessingthe-threat-from-emp-_final-april20 18.pdf [https://perma.cc/62TS-Z28B]; Sarah Scoles,
The Calm Before the Storms, SCIENCE 818, 818-19 (May 31, 2019) ("[Solar] storms can disrupt
communications, interrupt spacecraft and missile tracking, and skew GPS measurements. They
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taste of that possibility occurred in June 2019, as the failure of one
generating unit of the power system in Argentina shut down power
throughout that nation and parts of four others for the better part of a
day. 33 And the Baltimore experience demonstrates the far-reaching
impact of just one system-in that case, a few computer system
servers-failing.
Figure 1. A Conceptual Illustration of the Interconnectedness
of Elements Contained Within Each Critical Infrastructure34
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Cascade failures like these are network phenomena. 35 Networks
consist of components ("nodes") connected by some form of flow
channels ("edges" or "links") that move information, energy, money, or
whatever else the network distributes between the components. 36 Some

can also induce powerful currents in electric grids, which can destroy transformers and other
equipment.").
33.
Daniel Politi & Clifford Krauss, Massive Failure' in Power Grid Causes Blackout
in
Argentina and
Uruguay,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/world/americas/power-outage-argentina-uruguay.html
[https://perma.cc/FT9T-P79J].
34.

COMM'N TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)

ATTACK, supra note 11, at 12.

35.

Junbiao Liu et al., Thresholdfor the Outbreak of CascadingFailures in Degree-Degree

Uncorrelated

Networks,

2015

MATHEMATICAL

PROBS.

ENGINEERING,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/752893 [https://perma.cc/N64M-6BYR].
36.
MATTHEW 0. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 3-43 (2008).

at

1,
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nodes have a greater number of connections ("degree") than others. 37
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical network of different types of nodes
(arranged in loose clusters) connected by links within and across node
types, with nodes having varying degrees.
Figure 2. Network Graph Diagram Showing Nodes of Different
Types, Links, and Degrees 3 8

Vt.4

Network researchers have developed an array of metrics and
properties for describing network structure and behavior. 39 This Part of
the Article focuses on three network properties relevant to governance
of cascade failures: (1) systemic risk, (2) failure propagation, and (3)
network resilience.

37.
Id.
38.
This network diagram is a famous graph by Mike Bostock of the character
co-occurrence in the book Les Misfrables. See Mike Bostock, Les Misdrables Co-occurrence,
BOST.OCKS.ORG (Apr. 10, 2012), https://bost.ocks.org/mike/miserables/ [https://perma.cc/35MPNF32]. This version is from Observable. See Mike Bostock, Force-DirectedGraph, OBSERVABLE
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://observablehq.com/@d3/force-directed-graph
[https://perma.cc/6MHXWYCC]. But it could be a graph of any number of other kinds of networks.
See Bostock, Les Misdrables Co-occurrence, supra note 38; Bostock, Force-Directed
39.
Graph, supra note 38.
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A. Systemic Risk
Network researchers have begun to identify some attributes of
network structure and node connectivity that help explain the
conditions under which systemic risk of cascade failure is high. The
unifying research question is posed as: Under what conditions would an
initial disturbance remain localized rather than cascade through the
network? 40 At one extreme, a node that is not connected to the network
can fail and have no cascade effects because there is no means for the
failure's effects to enter the network. At the other extreme, a node that
is connected can fail and the entire network collapses. Research on
paradigmatic networks, such as power grids and banking systems, as
well as in simulation models, suggests that networks at that end of the
spectrum tend to exhibit coupled subnetworks with high
interdependency (e.g., the national power grid is a network of smaller
regional grids). A node connects to such a network to function, but it
may not matter through which path of links and nodes it receives its
supply of the functional medium (money, information, energy, etc.).
If it does matter, however-if a node must receive a critical
supply of network flow from another specific node-then the node
necessarily becomes dependent on all the other nodes along its critical
pathway of links. And if those pathways travel through more than one
subsystem in the giant network, those subsystems become
interdependent as well. Indeed, a node in one subsystem might be more
dependent on a node in another subsystem than it is on any node in its
own subsystem. 4 1 Those two nodes could also connect via a "shortcut"
link that involves no other nodes in either system, allowing direct
channeling of the network flow between subsystems. 42 For example, in
Figure 2, a node near the top, ni, has a shortcut link to a node in the
center right, n2, which could allow network flow to move directly
between their respective clusters rather than through a longer
multinode pathway.
The kind of system-of-systems described here is different in
structure from a simple isolated network in which all nodes and links
are uniform throughout the system. 4 3 Complex networks exhibit more
heterogeneity, with clusters of tightly connected nodes, nodes having
varying degrees of connections, and some nodes serving as shortcuts to
40.
Yang et al., supra note 3.
41.
Sergey V. Buldyrev et al., Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent
Networks, 464 NATURE 1025, 1025 (Apr. 15, 2010).
42.
Arun Kumar et al., Protection Strategies Against CascadingFailurefor Power Systems
of Ring Network, 8 COMM. & NETWORK 67, 68 (May 12, 2016).
43.
Yang et al., supra note 3.
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other subsystems. For example, Figure 3 shows the structure of the
Australian banking system with different types of banks and links
showing loan exposures between borrowers and lenders (arrows flow
from borrower to lender). Banks near the center of the network have
high degrees of exposure. Banks on the edges have less exposure, and
some have none.
Figure 3. Australian Banking System Network of Large
Exposure 44

* Major banks

* Smaller Australian-owned
banks

* Foreign-owned
banks

Credit unions and
building societies

44.
Eduardo Tellez, Mapping the AustralianBanking System Network, RES. BANK AUSTL.
BULL. 45, 49 (June 2013), https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/jun/pdf/bu-0613-6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD64-MV8F].
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While this complexity of structure may make the system more
robust at carrying out its functions, it ironically is also the source of
systemic risk.4 5 As a growing body of research demonstrates:
[T]he coupling between different networks induces a dynamical process of cascading
failures; a failure of nodes in one network leads to a failure of dependent nodes in
other networks, which in turn may cause further damage to the first network and so
on. This sequence of cascading failures may totally fragment the entire
system . . . . [T]he coupling strength of the networks, represented by the fraction q
of interdependent nodes, determines the way the system collapses. For strong
coupling, that is, for a high fraction of interdependent nodes, an initial damage event
can lead to cascading failures that yield an abrupt collapse of the system, in a form
of a first-order phase transition. Reducing the coupling strength below a critical
value, qc, leads to a change from an abrupt collapse to a continuous decrease of the
46
size of the network.

In systems-of-systems exhibiting high degrees of coupling-i.e.,
with coupling above the critical value qc-which nodes and which
pathways between subsystems matter, and when do they matter? That
may depend on variable conditions. In an electric power grid, for
example, there may be many cross-system shortcut pathways, and they
may change in topology as switching between different nodes (e.g.,
power supply units) occurs dynamically. Emerging research suggests
two properties are of the most concern. First, higher densities of
shortcut links between subsystems-the direct connections between
two nodes across the subsystems moving critical flow from one to the
other (or between both)-are associated with higher systemic risk.47
Second, there can be a small "vulnerable set" of nodes, the failure of
which can trigger system-wide cascades.4 8 These nodes tend to be
located in areas of the system with high densities of links and
concentrated levels of flow load through the system (e.g., densely
populated areas of a power service grid).4 9 Thus, "the primary failure of
a few links within or near a vulnerable set of links causes a
disproportionate number of large cascades."50 In a dynamic system,
however, the exact set of vulnerable links can change, but the overall
number of vulnerable links is small51 and can be roughly identified by

&

45.
David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their
Implications for Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS., MAN
CYBERNETICS 839, 843 (2010).

46.
Amir Bashan et al., The Extreme Vulnerability ofInterdependent Spatially Embedded
Networks, 9 NATURE PHYSICS 667, 667 (Aug. 25, 2013).
47.
Kumar et al., supra note 42, at 76-77.
48.
D'Souza, supra note 3; Yang et al., supra note 3.
49.
D'Souza, supra note 3, at 861; Yang et al., supra note 3.
50.
D'Souza, supra note 3, at 861; Yang et al., supra note 3.
51.
Buldyrev et al., supra note 41; D'Souza, supra note 3; Yang et al., supranote 3.
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their higher level of recurrent failure. 52 Table 1 summarizes what
research has suggested are complexity features that increase systemic
risk of cascade failure.
Table 1. Features Increasing Systemic Risk to Cascade Failure
Feature
Subnetworks
Coupling

Shortcuts
Heterogeneity
Topology

Vulnerable sets
Density

Risk Factor
Clustering of nodes into multiple subsets
increases system complexity
Higher interdependency between
subnetworks increases chances of failure
propagation between subnetworks
Direct links between subnetworks
facilitate failure propagation
Variability in nodes and subnetworks
increases system complexity
Dynamic system topology increases
system complexity and makes propagation
pathway prediction more difficult
Clusters of weak nodes increase the
chance of failure events
Density of nodes, particularly around
vulnerable sets, increases chances of
failure propagation

B. FailurePropagation
As research begins to reveal the conditions under which
systemic risk of cascade failure is high and the points at which failure
may be triggered, it is equally important to understand how and where
failure cascades through the systems-of-systems. Generally, two modes
of failure propagation have been identified. In structural failures,
damages spread directly, node-by-node, along the node-link pathways
that bind the subsystems together, like a chain reaction. 53 A chain
reaction is essentially the same event happening over and over, moving
through the system in linear node-to-node fashion, like the classic setup

52.

Buldyrev et al., supra note 41; D'Souza, supra note 3, at 861; Yang et al., supra note

3.
53.
Li Daqing et al., Spatial CorrelationAnalysis of CascadingFailures: Congestions and
Blackouts, 4 SCI. REP., June 20, 2014, at 1, https://www.nature.com/articles/srep05381
[https://perma.cc/XX8R-HVC2].
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of dominos falling one after the other.5 4 By contrast, overload failures
occur when the system responds to a perturbation (e.g., a wind storm
knocks over a transformer) by rerouting network flow to the point that
a node fails and immediately sheds the flow overload to other nodes,
some of which fail and shed even more overload into the system. 5 5 But

not every node along the way fails-some manage to move the overload
along without failing, and it is a node further along in the chain that
next fails. The propagation of overload failure, therefore, is not
necessarily a node-by-node line of failure along direct node-link
pathways. Rather, a node fails in one network location, then in another
potentially distant location, and so on in unpredictable patterns until
the overload becomes a global drag on the system as a whole.56 As a
number of network scientists explain, "In marked contrast to cascading
structural failures, overload failures usually interact and propagate in
networks globally due to cooperative overload pressure, without visible
or direct causal relations."5 7 This kind of failure-hopping effect has been
observed in collapses of power grid systems and banking systems,
where primary failure of one set of nodes is followed by failure of
another set of nodes located far away in the network from the first set,
and so on.5 8
Between the two propagation patterns, overload failures are by
far the bigger management and response challenge.5 9 Consider again
the power grid example. If failure follows a structural node-by-node line
pattern, the system manager could cut off a cascade by severing the
links located ahead of the failing nodes. In overload failures, however,
the system manager cannot necessarily follow the propagation of failure
node-by-node. 60 A cluster of nodes could fail in one location, after which
the overload would move through the system without failure along
many node-link pathways before it would bring down another set of

54.
To watch dominos falling for thirty minutes, see Hevesh5, 30 Minutes of
DOMINOES FALLING! - Most Satisfying ASMR Compilation, YOuTUBE (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUl295oyelc [https://perma.cc/U93M-RUAA].
55.
Daqing et al., supra note 53; Liu et al., supra note 35; Hoang Ahn Q. Tran & Akira
Namatame, Improve Network's Robustness Against Cascade with Rewiring, 24 PROCEDIA
COMPUTER SCI. 239, 240 (2013).
56.
For a stunning visualization of this effect in the power grid context, see Jun Yan, Demo
of a Potential Cascading Failure in San Francisco Bay Area, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGWDBsQNilU [https://perma.cc/S99F-YNTU].
Daqing et al., supra note 53.
57.
58.
D'Souza, supra note 3 (power grids); Daqing et al., supra note 53 (banking).
59.
Daqing et al., supra note 53.
60.
Xuqing Huang et al., CascadingFailures in Bi-Partite Graphs: Model for Systemic
Risk Propagation, 3 SCI. REP., Feb. 5, 2013, at 1, https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01219
[https://perma.cc/JB8Y-WQZE].
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distant nodes, and so on. To stop the cascade, the system manager may
have no option other than shutting down the entire system to cut losses.
Indeed, power distribution companies in the western United States,
where wildfires have been triggered by the sparks emitted from
overload failures (e.g., line failure from wind leads to exploding
transformers elsewhere), have begun implementing that approach for
system management during high wind and other risk conditions. 61

C. Network Resilience
Even systems with high levels of systemic risk aren't constantly
failing. Not every transformer outage or fender bender brings down the
system. Systems can be resilient. The question is how to make them so.
In their deep examination of resilience in complex network
systems, Alderson and Doyle explain that five key features of a system
contribute to the capacity to endure through surrounding change:
Reliability involves robustness to component failures. Efficiency is robustness to
resource scarcity. Scalability is robustness to changes to the size and complexity of
the system as a whole. Modularity is robustness to structured component
rearrangements. Evolvability is robustness of lineages to changes on long time
scales. 62

As they go on to point out, however, as much as these properties build
resilience, trade-offs between them can open the door to cascade
failure. 6 3 Consider the shortcut link strategy for moving network flow
between two nodes in different subsystems. A shortcut provides
efficiency of flow of the network medium (information, money, energy)
by providing a direct subsystem-to-subsystem pathway rather than
routing the flow along the multinode pathway out of one subsystem and
to the other. By providing an expedient route from one subsystem to
another, it also sheds overload-and thus risk. However, shortcuts
could also impair system resilience when the shortcut becomes a
pathway that speeds up failure propagation. On the other hand,
boosting modularity (e.g., by adding more variety of components) or
scalability (e.g., by continually adding components) could demand
resources that drain efficiency, exposing the system to failure if
resources become scarce.
61.
Katherine Blunt, Jim Carlton & Erin Ailworth, PG&E Starts to Cut Power for Nearly
800,000 California Customers on Wildfire Risk, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2019, 5:56
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ pg-e-warns-it-may-cut-power-for-600-000-customers-due-towildfire-risk- 11570513569 [https://perma.cc/8MM9-YUB8].
62.
Alderson & Doyle, supra note 45, at 840; see also A. Li et al., The Fundamental
Advantages of Temporal Networks, 358 SCIENCE 1042, 1042 (Nov. 24, 2017); Marta Sales-Pardo,
The Importance of Being Modular, 357 SCIENCE 128, 128 (July 14, 2017).

63.

Alderson & Doyle, supra note 45, at 840.
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Researchers have focused on how to balance these five properties
of resilience in the quest to reduce the risk of cascade failure. For
example, backing up high-degree interdependent nodes, such as
computer servers or electric transformers, to build reliability has been
shown to enhance robustness of coupled systems. 6 4 Increasing system

load capacity and evening out load-a constant challenge for large-scale
electric power grids-can increase efficient management of load
capacity.6 5 So-called "islanding" of certain node sets to provide them

alternative flow channels off of the main network-for example,
providing wind or solar power through microgrids as a backup for
important nodes, such as hospitals and other community services-can
increase system modulatory. 66
Similarly, systemic risk decreases when weak nodes (e.g.,
struggling banks) are linked to robust nodes rather than to each other. 67
Adaptive "rewiring" of a system, by changing link pathways and node
connection degrees, can also deflate cascade failure through
evolvability. 68 Transportation engineers, for example, are in essence in
a constant effort to evolve transportation networks by adding new
roads, rail lines, and so on.
Quick repair of failed nodes, particularly those closest to the
boundary of remaining functional nodes, also helps prevent cascade
failure. 69 After an electric grid failure, for example, repairs would start
closest to the remaining functional grid components rather than at the
outskirts of the failure propagation. And the selective, intentional
removal of nodes and links from a system, particularly shortcut links,
has been shown to reduce the continued propagation of failure even in
overload failures.7 0 Table 2 summarizes these strategies.

64.
M.A. Di Muro et al., Recovery of Interdependent Networks, 6 SCi. REP., Mar. 9, 2016,
at 1, https://www.nature.com/articles/srep22834 [https://perma.cc/T7KP-DZLK].
65.
Id.
Id.
66.
67.
Sebastian M. Krause, ControllingSystemic Risk - Network Structures that Minimize
It and Node Properties to Calculate It, ARXIv (Feb. 22, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.08483
[https://perma.cc/XP3Z-4SRQ].
68.
Tran & Namatame, supra note 55, at 247.
Di Muro et al., supranote 64.
69.
Id.
70.

424

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:2:407

Table 2. Resilience Strategies and the System Property They
Enhance
Strategy
Shortcutting

Property
Efficiency

Backing up

Redundancy

Load
managing
Islanding

Scalability

Node pairing

Reliability

Adaptive
rewiring
Severing

Evolvability

Repairing

Reliability

Modularity

Reliability

Implementation
Provide direct links
between node clusters
Provide replacement
components for high degree
nodes
Expand and smooth out
load capacity
Provide alternative flow
channels for identified
nodes
Support weak nodes
through links to strong
nodes
Alter and add link
pathways
Provide mechanisms to
sever identified nodes from
the network
Repair failed nodes quickly
from failure boundary
outward

While all of these research leads seem promising, putting them
into action in real-world SETS, rather than in simulation models and
purely technological systems (e.g., power grids), is an entirely different
challenge.
III. CASCADE FAILURE GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES
At 1:07 p.m. on Tuesday, April 23, 2013, hackers took over the
Twitter feed of the Associated Press and sent out a false tweet stating
that President Barack Obama had been injured in an explosion at the
White House.7 1 Within seconds, retweets spread the news like wildfire.
It is believed that automated stock-trading algorithms used by
investment firms "read" these tweets and immediately initiated trades

71.
See Christopher Matthews, How Does One Fake Tweet Cause a St
[https://perma.cc/8Q6E-EUQ9]. 4, 2013), http://business.time.com/20 13/04/24/how-does-one-faketweet-cause-a-stock-market-crash/ [https://perma.cc/8Q6E-EUQ9].
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acting on the news. Then other algorithms "saw" what was going on and
jumped into action as well. Over the course of a couple of minutes, the
S&P 500 lost almost 1 percent of its value-about $130 billion. As the
Associated Press corrected the misinformation, the market quickly
rebounded, although the distribution of winners and losers likely left
some traders on the short end.
Although the trading system recovered quickly from the
criminal tweet, the incident illustrates how tightly wired and connected
modern society has become. The social media system spread
misinformation faster than humans could react with correct
information; that failure jumped over to the stock-trading system,
which
today,
thanks
to
automated
algorithmic
trading
("algo-trading"), 72 Moves even faster in what are known as "subsecond
networks." 73 The whole incident-a swing of $260 billion just in the S&P
500-took just a few minutes. Society is, literally, a tweet away from
this kind of network cascade.
The stakes are too high-we must develop theories and practices
for cascade failure governance. Research initiatives are needed to forge
ground on three fronts: (1) system modeling and monitoring; (2) event
prediction; and (3) event prevention, response, and recovery.
A. System Modeling and Monitoring
The first step in designing cascade failure governance is to
recognize that large-scale, complex SETS permeate society and connect
effects in one subsystem to others. Social inequality affects gender gaps
in math;7 4 job loss is linked with inequality, which is linked with poorer
mental health, which is linked with lower education levels;7 5 meat
consumption affects human health and the environment; 7 6 human
population trends affect food production demands, which affect
biodiversity.7 7
Infrastructure
systems
are
also
incredibly
interconnected-the failure of a power supply unit could easily knock
72.
Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in CapitalMarkets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2015).
73.
Neil F. Johnson, To Slow or Not? Challenges in Subsecond Networks, 355 SCIENCE
801, 801 (Feb. 24, 2017).
Thomas Breda et al., Societal InequalitiesAmplify Gender Gaps in Math, 359 SCIENCE
74.
1219, 1219 (Mar. 16, 2018).
75.
Elizabeth 0. Ananat et al., Linking Job Loss, Inequality, Mental Health, and
Education, 356 SCIENCE 1127, 1127 (June 16, 2017).
76.
H. Charles J. Godfray et al., Meat Consumption, Health, and the Environment, 361
SCIENCE 243, 243-45 (July 20, 2018).
Ellen Crist et al., The Interaction of Human Population, Food Production, and
77.
Biodiversity Protection, 356 SCIENCE 260, 261 (Apr. 21, 2017).
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out regional oil and gas pipelines, communications systems,
transportation systems, water supply and treatment systems,
emergency services, banking and payment systems, and government
services. 78
Research from a wide variety of fields is converging on the need
to model such vast SETS as complex adaptive systems-systems "in
which large networks of components with no central control and simple
rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated
information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution."7 9
Attributes of such systems include aspects of self-organization; network
structure; emergence (the whole is different than the sum of its parts);
feedback (both negative, which has a stabilizing effect, and positive,
which has a destabilizing effect); the possibility of nonlinear behavior;
contextualization (i.e., the application of the same approach in a
different setting may not have the same results); and uncertainty.8 0
From finance81 to ecology, 82 the complex adaptive systems model is

increasingly dominating how researchers conceptualize SETS
dynamics. 83
As society builds viable models of different SETS using the
complex adaptive systems frame, governing cascade failure will require
the capacity to install sensors and monitoring techniques to minimize
time-to-failure detection.8 4 For example, monitoring many properties of
electric grid performance plays a large role in grid decision-making,8 5
and smartphone location tracking has vastly improved real-time
monitoring of traffic conditions.8 6 Given what cascade failure science

78.
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ATTACK, supra note 11, at 12, 17.
79.
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714-715 PHYSICS REP., Nov. 16, 2017, at 3-4; James Ladyman & Karoline Wiesner, What Is a
Complex System?, 3 EUR. J. PHIL. SCI. 33, 35-38 (2013).
81.
Battiston et al., supra note 27; Chambers et al., supra note 27.
82.
Rika Preiser et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive Systems:
Organizing Principlesfor Advancing Research Methods and Approaches, 23 ECOLOGY & Soc. 46,
47 (2018).
83.
Robert H. Samet, Exploring the Future with Complexity Science: The Emerging
Models, 43 FUTURES 831, 839 (2011). For more background on the use of complexity science in a
broad array of disciplines including law, see J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring,
Monitoring, and ManagingLegal Complexity, 101 IOWAL. REV. 191, 205 (2015).
84.
Alderson & Doyle, supra note 45, at 841-42 (2010).
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(discussing monitoring protocols throughout).
86.
Dave Barth, The Bright Side of Sitting in Traffic: CrowdsourcingRoad Congestion
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has revealed thus far, monitoring should focus on system features
covered above as most associated with primary failure events and
failure propagation: (1) areas of dense, high-degree nodes; (2) nodes
with recurrent failures; and (3) shortcut links.
To be sure, building models, installing sensors, and monitoring
are costly and challenging and may not be viable for all kinds of
systems. Model development thus far has focused on power grids,
banking, and social media.8 7 Of these, social media may present more
governance challenges, as platforms operate on the nebulous, global
internet system. In some senses, social media platforms such as Twitter
and Facebook are networks brimming with shortcut links-people
connect directly with each other-as well as node-to-node pathways
(e.g., through retweeting). Monitoring may be most efficient if focused
on high-degree nodes with high levels of recommunication, such as
so-called "influencers" and significant news outlets, such as the
Associated Press. There are also large clusters of nodes in social media
platforms that have self-organized into islands-more like echo
chambers-within which cascading effects may be of high potential.8 8
B. Event Prediction
The point of modeling and monitoring, of course, is to predict
failure events and maximize propagation detection. One technique used
for power grids and banking is stress testing-putting the model under
some form of discrete disturbance or load spike to see what happens.8 9
Also, as real-world and simulation data are incorporated into a model,
machine learning can be used to improve predictive analytics.9 0 This
may be particularly useful for systems prone to overload failures, given
the indirect pathways of propagation.
One serious challenge for event prediction in many SETS is
simply the speed of network flow. Event prediction and intervention has
to work faster than event propagation. As the Associated Press tweet
event demonstrates, many technological networks move at subsecond
87.
Yang et al., supra note 3 (power grids); Huang et al., supra note 60; Cindy Hui et al.,
Information Cascades in Social Media in Response to a Crisis: A PreliminaryModel and a Case
Study, 2012 WWW'12 COMPANION: PROC. 21ST ANN. CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB COMPANION 653,

653.
88.
Kazutoshi Sasahara et al., On the Inevitabilityof Online Echo Chambers, ARXIV (May
20, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.03919 [https://perma.cc/XU6N-SQBS].
Rodrigo A. Alfaro & Mathias Drehmenn, Macro Stress Tests and Crises: What Can We
89.
Learn?, 4 BIS Q. REV. 29, 29 (2009).
90.
Jake M. Hofman et al., Prediction and Explanation in Social Systems, 355 SCIENCE
486, 486 (Feb. 3, 2017); Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Datafor Policy Problems, 355
SCIENCE 483, 483 (Feb. 3, 2017).
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speeds. In that case, for example, to have done any good, the monitors
would have to have "read" the tweet, concluded it was false, and
predicted its impacts in the algo-trading network before the
algo-trading network's cascade response was triggered. Given how
aggressively algo-traders seek ever-faster systems,9 1 this will be quite
a challenge.
C. Event Prevention, Response, and Recovery
It is improbable that robust models, monitoring, and event
prediction can be developed for all SETS, even if only for some of the
more critical systems running society. To minimize impacts, therefore,
cascade failure governance is going to have to come to grips with the
need to intervene in networks in order to prevent harm and respond to
and recover from harm that cannot be prevented.
In terms of network design interventions, the cascade failure
science covered in Part II suggests that breaking up dense node
clusters, islanding weak, vulnerable nodes, and reducing shortcut links
are viable strategies. For example, banking system models suggest that
prohibiting weak banks from relying heavily on other weak banks helps
prevent cascade failure. 92 In social media networks, studies have shown
that a small percentage of accounts are the source of a high percentage
of so-called fake news. 93 Islanding them and controlling their output
could help moderate failure. Capping the number of "followers" for any
account and limiting the number of posts or tweets in any given time
period could effectively reduce shortcut links. The rise of hyperfast
networks, such as algo-trading and social media, has led some
researchers to suggest that slowing down network flow could also help
reduce cascading effects, although impacts of such intentional delay
mechanisms in complex networks, such as stock trading, are difficult to
predict.94

Design interventions like these would be difficult to install and,
in many cases, would be highly controversial (more below in Part IV),
making response and repair strategies all the more important. For
responses to an event, some of the design interventions could be
temporarily employed only when a failure has been detected. System
delay could be imposed, shortcut links could be severed, and weak nodes
could be walled off. Mechanisms for doing so would have to be in place
91.

MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).

92.
Huang et al., supranote 60.
93.
Nir Grinberg et al., Fake News on Twitter During the 2016 U.S. PresidentialElection,
363 SCIENCE 374, 374 (Jan. 25, 2019).
94.
Johnson, supranote 73.

2020]

CASCADE FAIL URES

429

and initiated either automatically or within the time frame of human
judgment. In the case of high-speed networks, the decision to
implement such measures must be made very quickly.
It may not be possible to install surgical mitigation responses
such as these for all kinds of networks or to implement them quickly
enough and with sufficient precision. In such cases, it may be more
practical to simply shut down the network temporarily, as some trading
exchanges do when prices free fall 95 and as some nations have done for
social media platforms in times of crisis. 96 Of course, a big question for
such response measures is whether more damage is done through them
than through the failure event. As the Baltimore ransomware event
illustrates, shutting down a computer server network to save the
servers would impose severe consequences for other systems dependent
on the servers.
Postevent recovery is also a critical element of cascade failure
governance. Failed nodes and links need to be repaired or replaced, and
the collateral damage of the cascade failure must be addressed. As
noted above, recovery strategies may be more effective by working
outward from the boundary between failed and remaining system
components.9 7 Ironically, however, some cascade failures do not inflict
any damage to nodes and links-they are a function of the network
working as designed. In the Associated Press tweet event, for example,
every node did what it was designed to do. In such cases, postevent
recovery may need to consider redesign of the network or installation of
more effective monitoring and prevention mechanisms.

IV. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
The previous Part engages cascade failure governance by
mapping the science onto policy with the single purpose of theorizing
strategies to prevent and mitigate cascade failures in important SETS.
The reality of governance will present significant institutional
trade-offs and normative challenges to following through on that policy
approach.

95.
Market-Wide Circuit Breakers, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/trading-info [https://perma.cc/4HP6-668F] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
96.
Max Fisher, Sri Lanka Blocks Social Media, Fearing More Violence, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/world/asia/sri-lanka-social-media.html
[https://perma.cc/PW2R-E5ZN].
97.
Di Muro et al., supranote 64.

430

AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:2:407

A. InstitutionalDesign
The greatest challenge to governance of cascade failure in
massive SETS is their scale, which transcends multiple governance
jurisdictions
vertically
(federal-state-local)
and
horizontally
(organizations that cover different subject matter across federal, state,
and local), and their speed, which can act in subsecond time frames. The
Baltimore ransomware event was a relatively contained failure that did
not propagate in any substantial sense outside of the Baltimore region.
But even within Baltimore, multiple municipal departments were
affected and involved in the recovery, and, as a major city, the impact
surely had consequences to Maryland and the region. As Figure 1
makes clear, a cascade infrastructure failure can cross many physical
and jurisdictional boundaries. Scaling this up to a multistate or
national level-such as in the event of a large electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) attack-presents a complete morass of intertwined and
independent authorities running different pieces of the network.
Faced with this daunting institutional challenge, the
commission on the EMP threat concluded in its 2017 report:
The single most important action that requires immediate action to advance U.S.
security and survivability is that the President establish an Executive Agent with
the authority, accountability, and resources to manage U.S. national infrastructure
protection and defense against the existential EMP threat (Recommendation 1).
Current institutional authorities and responsibilities-government, industry,
regulatory agencies-are fragmented, incomplete, under-resourced, and unable to
98
protect and defend against foreign hostile EMP threats or solar superstorms.

Precisely what this "Executive Agent" would look like, how it would be
authorized, and what it would be authorized to do is not explained in
the report. Could it direct other federal, state, and local entities, and
private entities overseeing large networks, to implement network
resilience strategies such as backups, islanding, and others outlined in
Part II? Would it develop, or order those other entities to develop,
system models, sensors, and monitoring? If it predicted a failure, would
it have the authority to order severing of portions of the network? If it
detects a cascade failure of international scale, can it wall off the United
States? Would it have control over postfailure repair and rewiring?
On the one hand, once one appreciates the potential scale, speed,
and impact magnitude of cascade failure in massive SETS, it is
appealing to imagine a single entity with this kind of sweeping
authority. Such an entity would be unprecedented in the federal model
of governance, but the resilience strategies discussed in Part II would
98.
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be difficult to implement without a strong, central authority to decide
where to install sensors, shortcuts, and backups; which node sets to
island and pair; when and how to rewire; and what system sections to
sever and repair. The transaction costs and time involved to disperse
these decisions throughout the system could make the decisions come
too late to prevent or mitigate the failure.
Centralized or not, there are profound obstacles to implementing
any kind of holistic governance regime simply as a result of how difficult
it is to define the problem. Going back to Figure 1, consider some of the
preliminary questions that must be answered in order to begin to design
governance strategies:

*

What is the system being managed? As Figure 1 illustrates,
one could identify the banking and finance system
for management, or one could take on the entire
system-of-systems.

*

Who owns and manages the subsystems? Figure 1 also
illustrates the complex distribution of ownership and
management, with some subsystems privately owned and
managed (banking), some publicly owned and managed
(government services), and some a hybrid (electric power).
And even privately owned and managed systems are often
subject to public regulation.

* How are the subsystems interconnected? Any of the
subsystems in Figure 1 could be the locus of initial failure,
but then what happens when it goes offline-what are the
failure propagation pathways to other systems?

*

What systemic risk features are present, and where? The
governing entity or entities will need to determine where the
systemic risk features (Table 1) are present in order to deploy
resilience strategies (Table 2).

Once these foundations are established, the job of institutional
design begins. At one level, the institutional design challenges for
cascade failures seem to present familiar questions, such as degree of
centralization, degree of interauthority coordination, and legal
instruments for policy implementation, each of which and many more
are implicated by the Executive Agent concept. But when unpacked, the
cascade failure problem presents, if not a unique governance problem,
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at least one that has exceptional properties that confound familiar
solutions. Table 3 suggests some of these challenges.9 9
Table 3. Example Institutional Design Issues and
Complications

How should

authority be
distributed?

How much and
how should
authorities
coordinate?

99.

Centralized (e.g.
federal
preemption)
versus dispersed
(e.g., state
primacy)

Mandatory or
voluntary
Strong or weak

Even within a
SETS of national
scale, a cascade
might affect only a
state, a region, or
the nation and can
appear in different
locations.
Decisions made
and events
occurring
anywhere in the
SETS, even
locally, can trigger
cascade failure at
that scale or at
larger scales. Both
dispersed and
centralized

designs may be
needed.
Complex
interrelated
infrastructure
systems can
involve a
multitude of public
and private
managers, making
coordination
difficult.

For a comprehensive overview of governance design issues for problems of this scale,

see ALEJANDRO

E.

CAMACHO

& ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN,

FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK (2019).

REORGANIZING

GOVERNMENT:

A
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How strong should
authority power
be?

Strong or weak

*

4.

What are the best
instruments to
use?
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Prescriptive
regulation,
permitting, and
subsidies
Taxes and
penalties
Planning

Cascade failure
may propagate
faster than
authorities can
coordinate
responses, in
which case
coordination
requirements
could exacerbate
failure.
Monitoring and
sensor strategies
require
comprehensive
authority over the
entire SETS, and
cascade failure
may require swift
emergency-based
intervention
authority, yet
strong authority is
expensive to
support and often
controversial.
Severing,
islanding, and
other strategies
may require
highly prescriptive
measures, but
rigid regulatory
regimes may
impede
evolvability.

Insurance
Postfailure
compensation

The costs of
cascade failure
prevention and
postfailure repair
may swamp the
capacity of

434

[Vol. 22:2:407

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

subsidy,
insurance, and
payment
programs.
B. Trade-Offs
Complex SETS provide many social benefits. As noted above,
system design features that add robustness to the system's capacity to
deliver such benefits can also expose the system to risk of cascade
failure. But this works both ways, in that a policy single-mindedly
focused on reducing systemic risk can undercut system robustness. For
example, shortcut links are efficient for moving information between
subsystems, and high-degree nodes are important switches in network
flow. Interventions on system design that remove, suppress, or slow
down such elements can impair system robustness. Anyone stranded in
an airport because of a blizzard at another major airport one thousand
miles away, essentially shutting down a sizable portion of the air
transportation network, feels the pain that results when a network is
driven by the efficiency strategy above all others. On the other hand,
building redundancy (have extra jets at all airports) and modularity
(switch flights around from other airports) may build resilience to
failure but drive up the cost of maintaining the network. Knowing how
much prevention is too much thus remains a challenge for cascade
failure researchers, and the trade-off, in general, presents a difficult set
of choices for policy makers as well as private entities overseeing large
networks such as power networks and supply chains.
Trade-offs will also exist between subsystems. For example,
adding reliability, redundancy, and modularity to infrastructure
systems to build resilience could require greater physical footprints
causing ecological damage. On the other hand, adding resilience to
ecological resources could require that infrastructure forgo those
resilience strategies, relying more on efficiency, thus threatening
infrastructure resilience. Indeed, a sizable component of environmental
litigation is over this tension between infrastructure resilience and
ecological resilience.
C. Normative Questions
Even if a governance regime could be designed to make all the
hard decisions about system management and trade-offs, it will have to
navigate difficult social concerns given the intensive measures some of
the resilience strategies require.
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1. Defining Failure
Not all network cascades are failures. By any measure, the
Baltimore ransomware event triggered a failure throughout the
municipal services and payments network. The Associated Press tweet
event, however, was only a failure because the tweet about the
President was false. Had it been true, many market participants would
have taken the rapid and precipitous drop in values to be a normal
response, and the network cascade would have been congratulated. The
failure was in the network's lack of capacity to detect the tweet's
falsehood. Similarly, the "Arab Spring" is often held out as an example
of an information cascade leveraging the internet and spilling over into
political and economic networks. 100 Whether it was a cascade success or
failure depends on perspective. Information cascades through trading
networks and social media networks all the time. Designing systems to
prevent or mitigate cascades is only half the problem-the mechanisms
also need to be able to sort what society has normatively assigned to be
the good cascades from the bad, do so quickly, and intervene decisively.
2. Allocating Harm
Many of the cascade failure control strategies involve imposing
local harm to avoid global harm. In the case of power grids, for example,
islanding areas of the network and shutting them down during event
response means those areas have no power. Severing shortcut links in
social media platforms would make it more difficult for some people to
communicate. Repairing networks from the failed-alive boundary
means components distant from the boundary suffer harm longer.
Lessons learned from natural disaster preparedness and response
suggest that this kind of harm allocation will present thorny issues that
policy makers will need to address. 10 1
3. Civil Liberties
There may be significant civil liberty constraints on how far
cascade failure governance can go toward implementing prevention and
response strategies. Constraining social media, for example, may raise
speech regulation concerns. Shutting down parts of power grids, given
the damage it can cause as critical infrastructure goes offline in severed

100.
Charles D. Brummitt et al., Coupled Catastrophes: Sudden Shifts Cascade and Hop
Among Interdependent Systems, J. ROYAL SoC'Y INTERFACE, Oct. 20, 2015, at 6-7, https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsif.2015.0712 [https://perma.cc/3UV9-D759].
101.

FARBER ET AL., supra note 25.
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areas, may be claimed to be a taking of property. Fine-grained,
real-time sensors and monitoring, such as through smartphone location
tracking and camera surveillance arrays, likely will present privacy
concerns. People depend on the networks that run SETS. Tinkering
with them, even with the goal of avoiding system-wide cascade failure,
will inevitably meet pushback, some of which may situate the concerns
as a violation of civil liberties.
4. Social Justice
Virtually everything about SETS cascade failures triggers social
justice concerns. To begin with, cascade failures generally harm those
already disadvantaged disproportionately across society, such as lower
income households that suffered predatory lending and foreclosures in
the Great Recession and marginal fishing and other businesses that lost
access to vital resources in the Gulf of Mexico in the BP oil spill.
Ironically, the vulnerable node sets in those cases were not those
socially vulnerable populations; they were wealthy banks and oil
industry companies. Rather, the vulnerable populations took the
disproportionate brunt of the cascade failure harms-they were the
casualties of the failure propagation. Resilience planning must take
into account these distributional concerns.
Resilience strategies must also be deployed to take into account
their distributional impact, such as who bears the cost, who is
protected, and the impacts of triggering strategies such as islanding
and severing. For example, severing portions of an electric power grid
to mitigate cascade failure will affect those who can afford backup
generators and distributed power systems, such as solar panels, far less
than it will those who cannot.
V. THE FATE OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

Sometime in 1986, it is believed, a commercial cargo ship left a
port on the north shore of the Black Sea, destined for the Great Lakes. 102
At some point after the ship entered the Great Lakes, it discharged
ballast. In that ballast were specimens of a mussel native to the North
Sea aquatic system-the zebra mussel. The cascade that followed has

102.
The account of the zebra mussel in this paragraph is derived from: Robert F.
McMahon, The Physiological Ecology of the Zebra Mussel, Dreissena Polymorpha, in North
America and Europe, 36 Am. ZOOLOGIST 339, 339, 359 (1996); Amy J. Benson et al., Dreissena
polymorpha, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Sept. 13, 2019), https://nas.er.usgs.gov/queries/FactSheet.aspx?SpecieslD=5_[https://perma.cc/YR4N-X9UF].

2020]

CASCADE FAIL URES

been nothing short of an ecological and economic disaster, for the zebra
mussel, it seems, found its new home to be nirvana.
The life history of the zebra mussel differs greatly from most
endemic Great Lakes-region bivalves, and all those differences, coupled
with the different physical conditions of the Great Lakes compared to
the Black Sea, gave it amazing adaptive capacities it does not enjoy in
its native habitat. Zebra mussels filter water at rates far beyond
endemic species, which has radically altered ecological conditions as the
water is clearer and sunlight penetrates the water column deeper. Their
voracious consumption of phytoplankton depletes food sources for fish.
The zebra mussel attaches to almost anything, including to boats
carrying them to other water bodies and to other zebra mussels, which
has facilitated its propagation through most of the freshwater systems
of the eastern United States. It also attaches to water intake pipes of
hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, public water supply plants, and
industrial facilities, creating cement-like formations that clog pipes and
are costly to remove. For these and other reasons too numerous to
recount here, the zebra mussel is considered the "poster child" of
biological invasions.
The discussion thus far in this Article has focused primarily on
the "S" and the "T" in SETS. What about the "E"-the ecological
component of SETS? The zebra mussel illustrates that the "E" matters
immensely to the "S" and "T."
This Article carves out the ecological component for additional
treatment because this component presents both the most potentially
catastrophic cascade failures and the most difficult governance
challenges. It would be preposterous to attempt to do justice to the topic
in one section of one article. Rather, here this Article offers a few
overarching observations about cascade failures in ecological
components of SETS.
First, the central point of the SETS model is that social,
ecological, and technological systems are subsystems of tightly coupled,
multiscalar complex adaptive systems. Social systems depend on
ecological systems for their well-being through the flow of ecosystem
services. 103 The resources needed to build technological systems come
from ecological systems. Cascade failures in ecological systems thus
threaten the robustness of social and technological systems and can
trigger cascade failures there as well.104 Yet, social and technological
Robert Costanza et al., Twenty Years of Ecosystem Services: How Far Have We Come
103.
and How FarDo We Still Need to Go?, 28 Ecosys. SERVS. 1, 1 (2017).
104.
Justin S. Brashares & Kaitlyn M. Gaynor, Eating Ecosystems, 356 SCIENCE 136, 136
(Apr. 14, 2017) (food gathering destroys ecosystems supplying the food, which threatens human
community stability); Twila Moon, Saying Goodbye to Glaciers, 356 SCIENCE 580, 581 (May 12,
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systems are the primary sources of cascade failure events in ecological
systems.10 5 In short, we and our stuff are the problem.
Second, almost none of the cascade failure governance strategies
outlined in this Article will work for ecological systems directly.
Aggressive islanding and severing of links have been employed with
limited success in the control of some invasive species,10 6 but by and
large, there is very little we can do in the way of ecological network
redesign and intervention to prevent and mitigate cascade failures.
There is no way to rewire the oceans or wall off the Amazon. Although,
one caveat here is the burgeoning research on technologies that actually
would allow us to rewire and repair ecosystems, such as de-extinction
methods and CRISPR gene-editing technology, both of which are
actively being pursued. 107
Third, postevent repair of ecological system cascade failures will
be costly and slow. The Everglades offer a classic example of an
ecological cascade failure triggered by rising phosphorous levels
entering the system from agricultural and urban systems. 108 The repair
effort, known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, has
a price tag of over $10 billion and will take over thirty-five years to
complete, and even then will only restore a small part of the system to
its prefailure state. 109
Finally, the two global ecological cascade failures we and
our stuff have set in motion-climate change and crashing
biodiversity-have already begun to trigger massive cascade failures in
social and technological systems, with far more on the horizon. The
ecological disruptions from climate change-altered hydrological cycles,
2017) (climate change from technology melts glaciers, which threatens freshwater supply to
human communities).
105.
Will Steffen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 115 PROC.
NAT'LACAD. SCIs. U.S. 8252, 8252 (Aug. 14, 2018); Crist et al., supra note 77, at 260; Aurora Torres
et al., A Looming Tragedy of the Sand Commons, 357 SCIENCE 970 (Sept. 8, 2017).
106.
Fred W. Allendorf & Laura L. Lundquist, Introduction:PopulationBiology, Evolution,
and Control of Invasive Species, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24, 28 (Feb. 2003).
107.
Jonas J. Monast, Governing Extinction in the Era of Gene Editing, 97 N.C. L. REV.
1329, 1329 (2019); Jon Cohen, Fields of Dreams: China Bets Big on Genome Editing of Crops, 365
SCIENCE 422, 423 (Aug. 2, 2019); Jon Cohen, The CRISPR Animal Kingdom: China Has Used the
Genome Editor More Aggressively, on More Species, than Any Other Country, 365 SCIENCE 426,
427 (Aug. 2, 2019). That said, de-extinction methods and CRISPR technology themselves may
spawn their own cascade failures if not managed effectively.
108.
Lance H. Gunderson et al., Escaping a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive
Capacityto Climate Changein the Everglades Social Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 146,
155 (2014).
109.
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), NAT'L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/ever/learn/nature/cerp.htm [https://perma.cc/RH5E-5QMA] (last visited Oct.
6, 2019).
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species migrations, sea-level rise, ocean-temperature rise and
acidification, heat waves, and many more-will trigger massive human
migration, require relocation of infrastructure, alter food supply chains,
and demand many more adaptation responses that will raise systemic
risk to cascade failure. 110 The collapse of biodiversity will threaten the
supply of ecosystem services, particularly to human populations in
developing nations least able to adapt, also raising systemic risk.111
Managing the heightened potential for cascade failures of this
magnitude and impact through the strategies outlined in this Article,
even if they could be practicably implemented, would pose substantial
social justice and civil liberty concerns far beyond those involved in
deciding whether to shut down part of a power grid for a few days. The
emerging climate justice movement 12 suggests profoundly difficult
policy choices lie ahead as the threat of cascade failure spreads through
SETS at all scales. In short, we are staring at a future of recurrent
cascade failures in SETS of all scales throughout the world, and there
may not be much we can do about them beyond adapting and repairing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Systems fail, and bigger, faster, more powerful and complex
systems cause bigger, faster, more powerful and complex failures.
Power grid blackouts have long attracted attention to cascade failure in
technological systems; the 2008 financial collapse put a spotlight on
cascade failure in economic systems; climate change threatens cascade
failure in ecological systems, triggering cascade failure in human
systems; cyberattacks and the sense that social media platforms are out
of control are the new cascade failure policy concerns. These are not
independent phenomena-they are interdependently embedded in and
cascading through large-scale social-ecological-technological systems.
As such, they are not independent governance propositions either;
rather, they go to the essence of how policies can build resilience into
SETS while balancing the systemic risk that comes with bigger, faster,
more powerful and complex systems.
Governing systemic risk to cascade failure in SETS thus is as
much a scientific challenge as it is a policy challenge. The science of

110.

IPCC, supra note 17, at 9, 11.

111.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SC.-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & Ecosys. SERVS.,

supra note 18.
112.
See MARY ROBINSON, CLIMATE JUSTICE: HOPE, RESILIENCE, AND THE FIGHT FOR A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2018); HENRY SHUE, CLIMATE JUSTICE: VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION

(2014).
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cascade failures in social, ecological, and technological systems seeks to
understand their causes and behavior and is developing metrics and
principles for describing systemic risk, failure propagation, and
network resilience. Governance institutions can benefit from the
techniques and strategies cascade failure science is exploring for
modeling, monitoring, event prediction, and event prevention, response,
and recovery. Yet these techniques and strategies could present difficult
policy choices. How much censoring can governance institutions impose
on people and businesses? Should we sacrifice some of the power of
social media or the banking system to reduce cascade failure risk? Who
decides what is or is not failure, and who decides which populations are
islanded from power or communications?
Legal scholars and practitioners have an important role to play
in resolving these questions. But rather than developing legal responses
for power grids, banking, social media, and other systems one by one, a
general legal theory of cascade failures is as critical to formulate as is a
general scientific theory. What are the legal techniques for deploying
system sensors, severing shortcut links, slowing down system speed,
islanding system parts, and building system modularity? What legal
concerns arise from using any of these techniques? With climate change
underway, cascade failures in SETS will only become more common and
more serious. This Article hopes to demonstrate that a legal theory of
cascade failure is desperately needed if they are to be effectively
governed.

